Introduction
The Nash bargaining solution (NBS) has long been used to model wage negotiations between firms and unions -examples include de Menil (1971) , McDonald and Solow (1981) , Nickell and Andrews (1983) , Anderson and Devereux (1989) , Dowrick (1989 Dowrick ( , 1990 , Leslie (1990) and Hoel (1990) . Much of this research has chosen quite arbitrary values for the parameters of the NBS -the status-quo point and the bargaining power index. However the completion of the Nash programme by Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1986) has helped more recent research to interpret these parameters correctly within the context of wage bargaining.
But the correct identification of the NBS parameters is not the only mathematical problem that has been 'glossed over' in economic applications of Nash bargaining theory. Generally, existence of a unique Nash bargaining solution is implicitly assumed in the literature, whether bargaining be in two-dimensions (over both wages and employment) or over wages alone with the firm reserving the 'right-to-manage', setting employment unilaterally according to its labour demand schedule. In this paper we show that, although concavity of the union's utility function guarantees uniqueness in the two-dimensional problem, sufficient conditions for existence of a unique solution to the constrained bargaining problem are much more complex.
In particular, we could impose strict monotonicity conditions upon the wage elasticity of the unions' utility function, the wage elasticity of employment and the labour elasticity of the firm's revenue function to ensure uniqueness of the NBS when negotiations concern wages alone.
Alternative sufficient conditions are also discussed and our results are illustrated with an example in which the wage elasticity of employment and the unions' risk aversion coefficient are both constant.
During the course of this work we have developed a general method for investigating the shape of the bargaining set for any type of revenue and utility functions. It turns out that this method is very useful in the analysis of any bargaining solution (such as the Kalai-Smorodinsky) to negotiations which may concern both wages and employment levels, or only wages. The method is explained in the appendix and used in the constant elasticity example of section three.
2.
Non-uniqueness in the 'right-to-manage' model
We consider the usual sort of utility function for models of firm-union bargaining. The union has utility V (ω,L) which depends on both employment L ∈ R and wages ω ∈ R. Specifically, following McDonald and Solow (1981) , and Dowrick
where u is a twice differentiable utility function, u'(ω) > 0 and u"(ω) < 0. The unions' utility is normalized so that u(ω*) = 0 for the competitive (or reservation) wage ω*. The firm's utility value is its profit, viz. the excess of revenue over costs. So
where R is twice continuously differentiable, R(0) = 0, R'(L) > 0 and R"(L)<0. Now suppose that a firm and union negotiate only the wage, and that firms reserve the 'right to manage' by setting employment unilaterally. Profit maximization yields the labour demand schedule R'(L) = ω which will act as a constraint on the wage negotiations and the firm's aspiration level is
where L* is such that R'(L*) = ω*. In fact the bargaining set becomes the image of the labour demand curve, which is a compact curve Γ in (Π, V) space.
Before investigating conditions under which no unique NBS to this problem exists, we must take a much closer look at this bargaining 'curve'. First, we show that natural assumptions about the wage elasticity of V imply only that the curve is 'downwards sloping' along its Pareto optimal boundary, and not that it is convex: for unions to engage in wage bargaining it is natural to assume that at some points along the labour demand curve, an increase in wages will not decrease the total utility of the union V, even though employment will decrease. Equivalently, the wage elasticity of V, ( ), ω δ is positive. However, this assumption only guarantees that dΠ /dV will be negative along Γ.
Denote by η(ω) the wage elasticity of employment, namely Of course it is not realistic to suppose that the elasticity of V with respect to ω is constant.
Typically it will decrease as the wage increases along the labour demand curve and may become negative for high values of ω. It is not unreasonable to assume that δ (ω) is positive for small ω, and then decreases monotonically as we move up the labour demand curve. Now as the wage increases along the labour demand curve so, by proposition 1, we move down Γ until the point where δ (ω) = 0. If no such ω exists then Γ never bends back on itself. But if there exists a finite ω such that δ (ω)= 0 then at this point ε = η, and the union achieves its aspiration utility level ) V .
Hereafter Γ bends back on itself, as δ (ω) becomes negative. As the wage increases further the continuity assumptions We now investigate conditions for a unique Nash solution to this one-dimensional bargaining problem: the existence theory of Nash (1950) holds only for two-dimensional bargaining sets. Denote by L the value of L for which Γ bends back on itself, and set 0= L if no such positive L exists. Now the problem is to find L to maximize the Nash objective function
is monotonic increasing in w, and
Proof: (a) Since Π = 0 when L = 0 and dΠ/dL = -R"L > 0 along the labour demand curve, the
then the Nash solution may be found as the unique solution to
The first order condition yields
where ζ is the absolute value of slope of the common tangent between the bargaining curve and the Nash objective. Thus the workers' utility at the Nash solution is proportional to the difference between the average and marginal products of labour. If G'(L) does not vanish and hence does not
The proof is given in Alexander and Ledermann (1994) .
(c) To prove this we first take logarithmic derivatives of (2), which yields
If we assume that ε(ω) is a monotonic decreasing function of ω then ε is a monotonic
If we assume that η(ω) is a monotonic increasing function of ω then it is a monotonic decreasing function of L, that is -
To guarantee that the last term of (3) is also a monotonic increasing function of L, we assume that
since the average product is always greater than the marginal product of labour. But the right hand term is monotonic increasing .
Hence the three monotonicity assumptions imply monotonicity of the left hand side of (3), and hence exactly one solution.
Of the three alternative sufficient conditions in theorem 1, the first is the least restrictive, but lacks both economic and geometric intuition. The second condition is that the Pareto optimal segment of Γ be 'convex upwards', and is similar to the standard convexity assumptions of the original two-dimensional problem (Nash, 1950) . The conditions (c) are much stronger than (a), but have more economic intuition. They show that if reaonable monotonicity assumptions are made about the wage elasticity of employment, the wage elasticity of individual's utility, and the labour elasticity of the firm's revenue function, then existence of a unique constrained Nash solution is guaranteed. The assumption of monotonicity of the wage elasticity of employment does, in fact, impose a positive upper bound on R", viz.
( )
as can be seen by differentiating η with respect to L. Similarly a negative upper bound on R" is imposed by the monotonicity assumption for
A Constant Elasticity Example
In this section we use the methods outlined in the appendices to take a detailed look at the shape of the bargaining set for both unconstrained and constrained bargaining problems when specific functional forms are assigned to the firm's revenue function and union's utility function.
We then show that the conditions for a unique NBS are satisfied by this choice of functions, whether bargaining be over both wages and employment or over wages alone. We assume that
where 0 < a < 1, so that risk aversion in the union is given by the constant a. We also assume that
where 0 < b < 1, so that the wage elasticity of employment is also constant:
In this case, with the notation defined in Appendix 1, we have 
we have, along the contract curve, that
which verifies that a unique Nash solution to the firm-union negotiation problem over both wages and employment exists (see Appendix 1). Now consider the bargaining curve when negotiations concern wages only, with employment set by the firm according to the labour demand schedule. In this case
is infinitely positive at ω*, monotonically decreasing thereafter and δ (ω) = 0 when ω is given by
So Γ is horizontal at ω*, and then dΠ/dV < 0 along Γ as ω increases up to ω m ; Γ is vertical at ω = ω m and then bends back on itself as dΠ/dV becomes positive. In this case, along the labour demand curve,
So the firm and the unions' aspiration levels of utility are Π * * / = The bargaining set in (Π,V) space is given by
where F is the set of feasible wage-employment pairs. Figure 3 illustrates the mapping φ between ( ω,L) space and the bargaining set in (Π,V) space. If negotiations do not reach agreement, so that no union members are employed by the firm and the firm makes zero profit, the status quo point ( ω*,0) is mapped to the origin of the bargaining set.
McDonald and Solow (1981) define the contract curve in (ω,L) as the locus of points of tangency between the profit and union indifference curves; thus
and so the Jacobian, J, of the transformation {Π(ω,L), V(ω,L)} is zero along the contract curve. Now, by definition, the contract curve is mapped to the efficient boundary of the bargaining set, so the inverse function theorem tells us that the transformation has a local inverse (so that points in the bargaining set have a unique image in (ω,L) space) except along the efficient boundary. Since
where ε denotes the wage elasticity of u. Thus wages are a mark-up on the marginal product of labour, since the union is a monopoly supplier of labour. Since R'(L) > 0 we have that ε(ω) > 1 along the contract curve. If we assume further that R'(L) → 0 as L → ∞ then also ε(ω) converges to unity as we move up the contract curve. If there exists a point ϖ such that ε(ϖ) = 1, the curve will become asymptotic to the line ω = ϖ. This gives rise to a feasible set
which contains the contract curve. Since dL/dω = u"/R"u' > 0 along the contract curve it is indeed monotonic increasing as shown in figure 3 (a).
( and, assuming R'(0) > ω*, it increases to a maximum given by
Thus at Π*, L is such that the marginal product of labour equals the competitive wage, that is L = L* and R'(L*) = ω*. Thereafter ( ) I Φ moves down the II-axis, becoming negative as L → ∞.
When L = 0 so also Π = V = 0 and so Φ(II) lies at the origin (status-quo) of the bargaining set. 
The contract curve
The Pareto optimal boundary of the bargaining set is given by the image curve, Φ(C); it is not possible for Φ(III) to cross Φ(C) because the wage is always greater along III than along C for a given level of employment. When ω = ω*, at the beginning of the contract curve, then also L = L*, Π = Π* and V = 0. Thus the contract curve has an image which intersects the Π-axis at the firm's 'aspiration point' (see figure 3(b) ). It is easy to show that
and so d 2 Π / dV 2 < 0, and the Pareto optimal boundary is convex. Now suppose that ε ( )
as so that the feasible set has no upper bound for ω. Provided still that R'(0) > ω* (which is a perfectly reasonable assumption) the segments Φ(I) and Φ(C) of the bargaining set are the same as in figure 3(b) . But dΠ/dV < 0 along Φ(III), which therefore remains below the Vaxis, and the bargaining set will be all points in the positive quadrant bounded by Φ(I) and Φ(C).
When this type of technique is used to determine the shape of a bargaining set, existence of a unique solution for any particular utility can be proved (or dis-proved) directly. For example, it is straightforward to show that concavity of u(w) is sufficient to guarantee existence of a unique NBS (a result which is stated but not proved in MacDonald and Solow (1981) ).
Appendix 2: The Constrained Kalai-Smorodinsky Solution and its relation to the

Constrained Nash solution
Since the existence proof of Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) does not apply to onedimensional bargaining we prove existence directly: the normalized coordinates of Γ are
and K(L*) < 0 so there exists at least one such L ks .. In order to prove uniqueness consider the derivative Thus, the relative magnitude of ω N and ω ks depends on a constant which is a function of the parameters of the utility function. More generally, the higher is the unions' index of bargaining power, the more likely that it will prefer the Nash solution and this is independent of its reservation wage.
